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ACCOUNTING PARADIGMS AND SHORT-TERM DECISIONS: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 
As more companies decentralize their organizational struc-
tures, they tend to fix on profit centers as the primary 
unit of managerial responsibility. This development ne-
cessitates, in turn, greater dependence on short-term fi-
nancial measurements like return on investment (ROI) for 
evaluating the performance of individual managers and man-
agement groups. 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1981. 
Abernethy & Hayes in this quote from their paper entitled "Managing Our 
Way to Economic Decline," charge that the growing reliance on profit centers 
in particular financial control and in general is stifling American business's 
ability to compete effectively internationally. The charge, if sustained, is 
a serious one since it is leading in their estimation to a decline in the 
overall economic well-being of business and ultimately of the entire body pol-
itic. 
Three things need to be established before this charge can be fully made. 
First, there must be a definition of financial control i.e., is it ~nly profit 
centers or is it a broader malady that is affecting American business? Sec-
ond, there is a need for a theoretical framework within which the effects of a 
financial control system on managerial decision making can be predicted and 
the cause and effect relationships traced. Third, one needs some empirical 
evidence that financial control systems are indeed composed of the short-term 
measures described by Abernethy & Hayes. This article provides some prelimi-
nary evidence on this third point. It also offers a definition of financial 
control systems that I have found useful in our empirical work, and finally a 
sketch of Cyert & March's behavioral theory of the firm within which I attempt 
to interpret the empirical findings. 
The paper attempts three things. First, it provides some support for 
Abernethy & Hayes claims that American businesses have become enmeshed in 
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short-term quantifiable measures. Second, it argues that if American busi-
nesses are to be encouraged to take longer term decisions, it is imperative 
that we develop the concept of strategic control systems. And finally, the 
paper suggests that we have relied too much on a rational model of planning 
and control and that more insight into the financial control process might 
come from the use of a learning model of the firm. 
The paper is broken into three sections. The first lays out the initial 
motivation for an empirical study conducted at the Sloan School of Management, 
MIT, by Dr. J. M. Mcinnes and the author and provides some of the preliminary 
empirical results. The second section compares the rational model of 
decision-making in the firm with a more behavioral model. The third section 
seeks to interpret the empirical findings in the light of the theory developed 
in the middle section. 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Financial Control: Financial control systems are ubiquitous. The term 
itself is freely used. It comes as somewhat of a surprise therefore to the 
would-be researcher in the area that no widely-accepted definition of the term 
exists and that empirical evidence on such systems is very sparse. 
Van Breda and Mcinnes sought to remedy this situation by an in-depth 
study of a number of American businesses. Van Breda (1980) offered the fol-
lowing definition as a basis for this research: 
A financial control system is a set of related dollar-denominated 
variables used in interactions between individuals to 
1) measure the performance of individuals singly or in aggregate 
2) signal the results of efforts by individuals to others 
3) determine, partially or wholly, rewards for performance. 
In other words, a financial control system is a means of communication, a 
means of evaluation, and a means of motivating. 
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The definition is broad and intentionally so. The system can include 
variables drawn from the accounting system but also from other financial 
frameworks such as present value analysis. It could also include market data 
such as the firm's share price. One of the major research questions at issue 
was which subset of the universe of possible variables did management choose? 
Our hypothesis was that this choice would reflect the particular situation of 
the firm-- in other words, we had a contingency model of the financial con-
trol system in mind. 
Central to the definition was the adjective "related." Webster's first 
definition of a system is a set or arrangement of things so related or con-
nected as to form a unity or organic whole. By definition then, if a finan-
cial control system is to constitute a system then the variables which compose 
it must be related or connected. 
A related set of variables may also be defined as a symbolic model. The 
financial control system is in this sense a model of the organization with ex-
ogenous variables being treated as parameters to the model. The nature of the 
model, or models, in use in an organization, or equivalently, the set of per-
ceived relationships between variables, especially financial control vari-
ables, constituted an important area of our research. We return to this point 
later where we argue that the financial control system is a powerful and per-
vasive model of the firm which shapes managerial decision-making critically. 
The Sample: The decision was made to research the issue of financial 
control systems within the context of publicly-quoted, widely-held companies. 
The reason for this was to attempt to exclude from consideration companies 
which might be pursuing idiosyncratic financial policies stemming from the 
specific utility of a dominant ownership coalition, rather than from policies 
which might be attributed to an interpretation of the financial markets in a 
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more general and impersonal sense. Time and financial exigencies further con-
strained the population to companies on the North East corridor. Given the 
diversity of companies in this area this was not perceived as a restriction on 
generality. 
The choice of companies was restricted further to enterprises with a sin-
gle, or dominant, product or production technology, on the grounds that the 
senior management of such enterprises would be likely to be familiar with the 
business characteristics of operations and so could exercise a relatively un-
restricted choice of emphasis in information sets between financial and non-
financial. The intent was to control for diversity of operations therefore. 
This had the effect of controlling the population in respect to size of inter-
prise since there is some evidence to indicate that size and diversity are 
relatively collinear. 
Within this population a judgmental sample was drawn rather than a ran-
dom sample. Chou (1975) lends support to this approach for pilot studies. 
The reason it was deemed appropriate here was that it enabled us to design a 
sample that gave contrast in terms of the explanatory variables of interest. 
These variables were themselves selected from a longer list on the basis of 
a priori theorizing as being of especial interest to current research into fi-
nancial control systems. By making a judgmental sample it was possible in 
part to control for excluded explanatory variables. 
Despite these justifications for the sampling technique employed the re-
sults and conclusions reached in this paper should be regarded as merely sug-
gestive. The structure, size, and distribution of the survey should be borne 
in mind when reading the results and conclusions. Any attempt to make the 
survey statistically valid would be misleading considering the small sample 
size. 
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Initial contact with firms was made by letter, a copy of which is at-
tached as Exhibit I. A follow-up telephone call was made within two weeks of 
mailing. It was necessary to follow this up in turn with a brief interview 
with the firm's contact person to explain more fully our intended research 
design. The intent of this prior interview was to attempt to ensure that we 
met those members of the firm most useful to us. Firms on their own tended to 
structure interviews around the designers of control systems only, where we 
wanted to talk to users as well. Damage to the integrity of the research was 
limited since only the initial contact person was involved in these discus-
sions. 
The Questionnaire: An early decision in the research design phase was 
that relatively in-depth, on-site interviews should be conducted. The re-
search tool that emerged was a set of questionnaires consisting of a mix of 
closed and open-ended questions. 
These questions were not without their problems. Broad, open-ended ques-
tions are potentially excellent vehicles for drawing non-directed and non-
influenced answers. They are also useful devices for testing recall and gaug-
ing thereby importance of a topic to a subject. Another advantage is their 
ability to elicit broad and subtle suggestions, comments, and arguments on and 
around the topic being explored. On the other hand, an open~ended question-
naire can yield unsatisfactory results simply because of the great leeway they 
offer the subject. If the response is to be of value, the interviewer has to 
exert subtle, but very careful control in order to enforce some uniformity in 
the way the subject responds. As a result of these comments a blend of both 
closed and open-ended questions was attempted. No obvious questioning bias 
emerged during the course of the research so that we were fairly convinced of 
the reliability of the instrument. 
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Of particular interest to this paper were our questions on the goals and 
measures used by managers in our study. Copies of the relevant questions ap-
pear in Exhibit II. These questions were put to a wide variety of managers 
the general manager, the controller, the planner, the marketing manager, 
the production manager. Our obvious hypothesis in doing this was that goals 
and related measures would vary across functional areas in the firm. 
The essential issue being researched at this point was how the firm's 
goals related to the reward and incentive system. To this end a series of 
questions were asked. The way these relate to one another may best be seen in 
diagrammatic form: 
General Manager Unit Manager 
Long-term goals 
.J, 










A distinction was drawn therefore between the measures used to evaluate the 
performance of the unit itself and of the manager himself. Cross checks were 
built into the research by questioning the manager and his supervisor. 
Our intent was to draw out of management their long-term strategies and 
goals and then to see how these translated into short-term goals and tactics. 
Our expectations were that these would be mostly qualitative and nonfinancial 
especially the statements of long-term goals. We were then interested in 
how these goals were translated into measures. We expected these in turn to 
be quantitive and a mixture of financial and nonfinancial. Within the set of 
financial measures we expected to find a blend of accounting-based and non-
accounting variables. 
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Hypotheses and Results: Stated otherwise our hypotheses were fundamen-
tally two. First, we expected the control system as a whole to vary by func-
tional area. More specifically, we expected the marketing manager to be mea-
sured on different variables from the production manager and each to have a 
different goal set. Second, we expected the financial control system, defined 
here as the set of dollar-denominated variables used for control, to reflect 
the strategies of the firm as mediated by the short-term goal statements. As 
a subsidiary hypothesis we expected the financial control system to consist of 
a mixture of accounting and non-accounting variables. More specifically, we 
expected the variables to be a blend of financial and managerial accounting 
variables. 
An example of what we expected to find ran as follows. A firm might have 
stated as one of its long-term goals its intent to become the dominant firm in 
its industry. This could have translated into a desired market share of a 
certain percentage. This would have certain implications for the near term 
such as a desired growth in sales for the coming year and an investment pro-
gram in the manufacturing area. Each of these could have had certain 
measures -- a target sales figure for this year for instance and a three year 
growth figure for example. Other performance measures might have included the 
relative performance of competitors. 
Our findings were dishearteningly negative both from a research point of 
view and, bearing Abernethy and Hayes' comments in mind, from a larger soci-
etal point of View. Exhibit III lays out the short and long-term goals men-
tioned by managers of petrochemical firms. A glance at the statements of 
long-term goals of these managers reveals an alarmingly high preponderance of 
financial measures -- more than 50 percent of the goals mentioned are nothing 
more than accounting variables. Market share is mentioned by three of the 
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four firms but the reason for desiring market share is missing. Market share 
per se is after all more in the nature of a tactic than a goal. Most notice-
able here is the complete absence of what has been termed superordinate goals. 
It should be noted that the order in which these goals appear does not give 
any indication of their importance. We did attempt to get managers to rank-
order their goals but failed in the attempt. Managers found it extraordinar-
ily to prioritize their goals and most answered that all were equally impor-
tant. 
The short-term goals are even more noticeably oriented to short-term op-
erations and more especially to accounting variables. TWo firms did mention 
personnel development but in the interviews these followed after items such as 
revenue, expenses, or profit as a goal. It is also noteworthy how small a 
difference there was between the statements of short-term and long-term goals. 
The overlap is almost complete. 
The measures mentioned by the managers appear in Exhibit IV. These are 
virtually entirely short-term in nature. It is also noteworthy that with one 
possible exception, namely pound-volume output in firm three, every measure 
mentioned is financial in nature. More specifically, the measures are all ac-
counting based. 
A detailed analysis of these measures was done by functional area to test 
our hypothesis that the measures would vary across the firm. Our hypothesis 
was confirmed but in an obvious manner only. Sales departments tended to 
stress revenue measures and production departments stressed cost measures, and 
so on. In other words, once one knows the organizational structure of the 
firm one can predict with almost complete certainty the control structure 
or at least the financial measures that will be in place across the firm. 
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To sum up then, we expected to find a preponderance of broad and qualita-
tive long-term goals. Instead we found that even long-term goals tended to be 
stated in very financial terms. There was a complete absence of superordinate 
goals for instance. We expected to find short-term goals to be a derivative 
of long-term statements. Instead, we find them to be virtually the same. We 
expected to find a fairly broad range of measures in place in firms. Instead 
we found them to be almost entirely accounting in nature. We did find that 
measures varied across the firm but this corresponded almost exactly with the 
organizational structure -- we found no manufacturing departments that were 
evaluated on the basis of profit for instance. 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
The Rational View: Accounting is typically defined as an information 
system that supports the decision-making of shareholders, managers, and 
others. One way to conceptualize this role is to think of a typical decision 
matrix. The manager, say, has a range of actions open to him. A number of 
states of nature are feasible and may be predicted with a certain set of prior 
probabilities. Each combination of state and action leads to a possible out-
come. The manager has to select that action that over the range of possible 
outcomes yields the most desirable vector. A typical decision rule is to max-
imize expected profit. 
When information enters in such a world, the manager is assumed to revise 
his set of prior probabilities. Most commonly this revision process is pre-
sumed to follow Bayes Rule and to lead to a set of posterior probabilities. 
Should the combination of the posterior probabilities and actions lead to a 
changed action and, by implication, to a more valuable set of outcomes the in-
formation is said to have value. 
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This model is essentially rational. Typically, it is accompanied by 
statements about the goals of the firm and how accounting assists managers to 
allocate resources in accordance with these goals. Often too, there is at 
least the implicit assumption that managers know all the relevant actions open 
to them, that they are aware of all the possible states of nature, that they 
understand the transformation process that generates outcomes, and that they 
continually and actively search out new information and alternatives. 
The Behavioral View: A potentially more useful model of the managerial 
process is presented in the work of Cyert & March (1963) in their behavioral 
theory of the firm. Following the earlier work of Simon (1947), they argue 
that there are cognitive limits that constrain decision makers. Simon called 
this "bounded rationality" to distinguish it from the notion of "comprehensive 
rationality" assumed in the economic literature. Allison (1971) described the 
notion of bounded rationality in these terms: 
The physical and psychological limits of man's capacity as alterna-
tive generator, informat~on processor, and problem solver constrain 
the decision making processes of individuals and organizations. Be-
cause of these bounds, intendedly rational action requires simpli-
fied models that extract the main features of a problem without cap-
turing all its complexity. 
Importantly, therefore, one sees the need for a model of the firm as a result 
of our inability to comprehend the world in all its complexity. 
Restated, two things follow immediately from the assertion that managers 
are bounded rationally. First, there is a need to simplify the world by the 
construction of a model of reality. Ackoff & Sasieni (1968) defined a model 
in these terms: 
Models are representations of reality. If they were as complex and 
difficult to control as reality, there would be no advantage in 
their use. Fortunately, we can usually construct models that are 
much simpler than reality and still be able to use them to predict 
and explain phenomena with a high degree of accuracy. The reason is 
that although a very large number of variables may be required to 
predict a phenomenon with perfect accuracy, a small number of vari-
ables usually account for most of it. The trick, of course, is to 
find the right variables and the correct relationship between them. 
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The issue would seem to be whether management has indeed turned the trick and 
found the right set of variables and correctly established the relationships 
between them. Abernethy & Hayes seem to be suggesting otherwise. 
Second, there is no a priori guarantee that consensus will exist on the 
choice of a particular model. On the contrary, one can predict with virtual 
certainty that considerable diversity will exist in beliefs as to the most ap-
propriate model. On the other hand, Duncan & Weiss (1979) argue that if man-
agers are to be able to communicate among themselves it is vital that they 
have an agreed upon model. If necessary such a consensual model must be im-
posed on members of an organization to forestall anarchy. 
Such a consensual model begins to take on the characteristics of a para-
digm. This has been defined as a set of beliefs that govern one's perception. 
This would appear to be one step up from a simple model to what one might call 
a meta-model. Paradigms are not merely tools used in decision making but ac-
tual shapers of perceptions and thoughts that govern the decision process. 
The Learning Process: Such a view is important to our understanding of 
the learning process within organizations. Duncan & Weiss define organiza-
tiona! learning 
as the process within the organization by which knowledge about 
action-outcome relationships and the effect of the environment on 
these relationships is developed. 
Though they do not state it as such, organizational learning can be posited to 
take place in the rational mode through the process of Bayesian revision of 
prior probabilities. This is a gradual process that leads to priors being re-
fined step by step over time as new information emerges. 
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Paradigmatic learning is more closely related to the techniques of class-
ical statistical testing. Information is rejected as essentially worthless 
unless it reaches a certain level of significance when one's initial hypothe-
sis is summarily rejected. In other words, paradigms do not seem to be gradu-
ally refined. Rather they are ultimately overwhelmed by a body of anomalies. 
Such a. view of learning as a discrete process strengthens the assertion that 
paradigms are an extremely powerful shaper of- perceptions and ultimately of 
decisions. 
Returning to the Cyert & March behavioral theory of the firm, their sec-
ond contention is that the search for new information is generated by prob-
lems. In other words, search is not a continual process but a discrete pro-
cess again motivated by a problem -- defined, as we have argued, by the para-
digm within which the decision maker is operating. The rational model, on the 
other hand, posits continual search which considerably reduces the power of 
the accepted paradigm since it does not or is not seen to govern the search 
process. 
A further aspect of the behavioral theory that would seem pertinent to a 
theory of learning in the firm is the notion of satisfycing i.e., in choosing 
between alternative courses of action managers are assumed to pick an alterna-
tive that seems "good enough" rather than one that is optimal in a more global 
sense. To the extent that a short-run response is perceived as "satisfactory" 
there may be a diminished need for long-run solutions. 
Three more aspects of the learning process round out our understanding of 
how an organizational paradigm affects managerial decision making. First, or-
ganizational learning involves adaptation which may be defined as a modifica-
tion over time of goals. Second, organizational learning also entails a 
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change in the attention rules. Given the need to simplify reality organiza-
tions attend to only some parts of their environment. Ideally these corre-
spond to the critical variables that Ackoff & Sasieni refer to. Third, organ-
izations modify their search rules as they learn more about their environ-
ments. 
ACCOUNTING MODELS 
The Paradigm: At this point we may return to our discussion of our find-
ings and relate them to the view of organizational learning described briefly 
above. As stated above, accounting is often described simply as an informa-
tion system which is supportive of, but not necessarily in control of, the 
decision process. However, once we begin to view the organization in terms 
of a behavioral theory of the firm and more particularly in the light of 
organizational learning theory then it becomes plain that accounting poten-
tially plays a far more important role. In brief, our contention is that ac-
counting forms the paradigm within which the firm operates. 
Our grounds for this contention are several. First, it needs no proof 
that accounting is the most widely used model in virtually every organization 
but especially in profit-oriented businesses. Other models exist of course 
but this one is found in every business and pervades almost every aspect of 
it. 
Second, it is an obvious but seldom explored fact that accountants do not 
present raw data to management. Revenue, for example, is defined by fairly 
precise rules and cannot be earned, in general, until goods or services are 
delivered. In many firms this leads to a scramble at the end of the month to 
get goods out of the door even though managers know that the sale has been 
"won" and that delivery is merely a deterministic follow-up. This last minute 
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rush puts a strain on production, disrupts the production process, and is 
costly in an opportunity cost sense. Yet managers continue to do it because 
of the way accounts define the revenue earning process. 
Restating this last, accounting acts as a classical paradigm defined as a 
set of beliefs that govern management's perceptions. It is not merely an in-
formation system in this context but a shaper of the decision process itself. 
In the example quoted it affected the production process but examples could be 
multiplied of how numerous decisions are affected because of the way accoun-
tants interpret the raw data of economic events. 
A third reason for our belief that accounting acts as a paradigm or meta-
model lies in our empirical findings. As stated earlier, virtually all the 
goals and measures used in the firms we have interviewed relate relatively 
directly to the accounting system. We hypothesized that we would find goals, 
long-term goals especially, that would be qualitative in nature. Instead we 
found that even long-term statements tended to be put in accounting format. 
We hypothesized that the measures themselves, the critical variables in the 
model, would be a mixture of financial control variables defined in the broad 
sense of the earlier definition and some quantitative variables that were not 
financial in nature. Instead we found that almost all measures were account-
ing based in the narrowest sense of accounting. In short, it seems clear that 
accounting dominates the thinking of managers of American corporations. 
That this should be so is not terribly surprising. If we allow that 
a priori there are a wide variety ~f models available in an organization and 
follow Duncan & Weiss in their assertion that a common, consensual model is 
necessary for communication then one might expect to find managers turning to 
the one model that is closest at hand. Furthermore, if one allows for satis-
fycing then one has grounds for believing that managers will accept this model 
on grounds that it is "good enough." The question that Abernethy & Hayes 
raise is whether it is good enough any longer. 
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Some Implications: There is no question that the potential influence of 
the accounting paradigm is tremendous. If one reexamines the three aspects of 
organizational learning one notes that accounting affects all three. First, 
our findings indicate that accounting determines to a certain degree the ac-
tual goals of the firm. In other words, the adaptation of goals is presumably 
taking place within the accounting paradigm. Service, for instance, might be 
a better goal and profit a concomitant, but as long as we are in the account-
ing paradigm profit will be the preeminent goal of businesses. 
Second, accounting defines the variances which define in turn the search 
rules of the organization. A problem is defined in terms of accounting 
variables and does not exist except as it shows up as a variance. Third, 
accounting defines the attention rules of the organization. Opportunity 
costs, for example, are not revealed by the accounting system and as such 
little attention is paid to them potentially. 
The implications of all this tend to support Abernethy & Hayes' conten-
tions. One should qualify this by saying that it is not financial control as 
defined in this paper that is a problem but how financial control is defined 
in practice that is at fault. Nontheless, there does seem to be pervasive ev-
idence that many American corporations tend to stress short-term accounting-
based variables in their control systems. If one places this against a model 
of the firm that is behavioral in origin and involves organizational learning 
then it becomes apparent how the accounting paradigm might be generating the 
problems to which they refer. 
The solution is not easy. Paradigms are not easily shrugged off. High 
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might lead to improved paradigms. Increasing competition from the Japanese 
also seems to be leading managers to reflect on current practices. Academia 
too will have to play a role in defining the shape of what we earlier termed a 
strategic control system might look like and how managers might use it in pur-
suit of better decisions. 
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EXHIBIT I 
Text of Letter Sent to Candidate Firms 
Dear 
I am writing to invite your company's participation in a research program into 
financial control systems that we are conducting at the Sloan School of Man-
agement. 
We plan to visit approximately twenty companies during January and early Feb-
ruary. We envisage that the necessary data could be collected during a 1-day 
visit to your firm by one or two members of our research team. We would like 
to emphasize that we are not looking for data which is likely to be regarded 
as sensitive in any sense. 
The subject of our research is the design and use of financial control sys-
tems. A lot has been writte.n about this; however, in the final analysis it 
tells us very little about the practice of financial control and the design 
of financial planning and reporting systems as this relates to the character-
istics of different industries and to the position of a company within its in-
dustry. 
The field research that we plan will cover four or five companies drawn from 
each of four industries. In the course of the visit, our researchers would 
wish to interview several managers in the organization -- managers within the 
accounting and control activity itself, and managers in functional and general 
line management positions. In addition to interviews, we are developing a 
questionnaire to support the collection of research data. We would also find 
it useful to have copies of procedures documentation, if these exist and where 
they can be made available. 
As we stressed earlier, the information we are looking for is unlikely to be 
regarded as sensitive. Moreover, all information provided to us in the course 
of the research will be treated in strict confidence. Any quantitative data 
will be coded to disguise its source. Research results themselves will be 
presented in summary form in such a way as to preserve the confidentiality of 
company-specific data. 
As output from the research, we expect to achieve a greater degree of under-
standing of the development and use of financial information in the planning 
and control process in profit-directed organizations. We hope that we will be 
able, as a result of the research, to offer more definitive guidelines con-
cerning the important considerations in evaluating and designing financial 
planning and reporting systems. While it is never clear in advance what bene-
fits a company will gain from participating in a research program of this 
kind, it is common in my experience for them to find it worthwhile simply in 
terms of stimulating their thinking about the particular subject of the re-
search. Research results will be made available to you of course, and you may 
wish to discuss these with us in terms of your approach to financial control. -
EXHIBIT I (contd) 
We would like to be able to have commitments from companies concerning their 
willingness to participate, prior to Christmas. Therefore I plan to follow up 
this letter in the near future with a telephone call to you, to respond to 
questions which you may have and get your reactions to the proposal. 




1. a. What are the long term goals of the firm? 
b. Please rank these in order of importance. Could you weight these 
in approximate percentages? 
c. Which ones have specific targets? 
2. a. What are the firm's current year goals? 
b. Please rank them in order of importance. Could you weight these 
in approximate percentages? 
c. Which ones have specific targets? 
d. Which long term goals do these relate to? 
3. a. What measures are used to assess the performance of the units in 
your organization? 
b. Please rank them in order of importance. 
c. Please relate these measures to your long term and current year goals. 
If not related to any goals why was that particular measure chosen? 
Unit Manager 
1. a. What are your unit's goals for the current year? 
b. Please mark them in order of importance. 
c. Which goals have specific targets? 
d. To which company goals do these relate? 
2. Are the measures used in assessing the performance of your unit the same 
as the measures used in assessing your personal performance? If not, 
please explain. 
3. a. What are the measures used in assessing your personal performance? 
b. What is the relation of these measures with the long term goals and 
short term goals of the company? 
c. Which of these measures have specific targets? 
d. Which of these measures are made an explicit part of the consideration 







GOALS OF PETROCHEMICAL FIRMS 
LONG TERM 





Revenue, sales volume 
Production volume 
Customer portfolio 
Market share, market 
position 





Market share, quality 
Major customer portfolio 














Cash flow, capital expenses 













Cash flow, profit 
Capital investment 
ROI 
Revenue, operating yield 
Manufacturing costs 
EXHIBIT IV 
MEASURES - PETROCHEMICAL FIRMS 
FIRM 
Cl: Volume/price, general expenses, profit, sales 
volume, ROA 
C2: ROA, profit, capital expenditures, production 
volume 
C3: Unit cost, volume effect, utility cost, profit 
and loss, net profit, cash flow, pound-volume 
output 
C4: Pretax profit, return on sales, return on 
investment, revenue, cash flow 
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